

Utah Citizens' Advisory Commission on Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Deseret Chemical Depot

Thursday, March 16, 2000 - 6:00 p.m.

Department Of Environmental Quality Building

Minutes

Members Present:

JOHNSON, Susanna Sec. CAC	
BAUER, Dan State Science Advisor	JONES, Steve EG&G
DOWNS, Dennis DEQ	KING, Cindy Utah Sierra Club
HOLT, Rosemary Women Concerned	MADDOX, Jack EG&G
HULLINGER, Sid Tooele County	MESESAN, Mark EG&G
KIM, Deborah University Hospital	OLIVER, Harold DCD
OSTLER, David SAC	OWENS, Doug Parsons Behle & Latimer
SILCOX, Dr. Geoff U of U	PATE, Col. Ed DCD

Guests Present:

ROWE, Michael J. EG&G	
BILLS, Ray TOCDF	SAGERS, Kari Tooele Co. Emergency
BITTNER, Chris DEQ	SALSBURY, Bud CEM
ERNSTROM, Paula CEM	SCHMERKER, Jeff Tooele Transcript Bulletin
GRAY, Martin DEQ	SNELL, Dick EG&G
GRENIER, Roger TOCDF	STRICKLAND, Steve Battelle
GROENEWOLD, Jason F.A.I.R.	THOMAS, Tim PMCSD
HOLT, Reed L. OME	WARBY, Clint PMCD

INTRODUCTION/MINUTES/CAC MEMBERSHIP - Dan Bauer

Dan Bauer called the meeting to order and welcomed all of those in attendance. A motion was made and seconded to approve the February 17, 2000 minutes as written. The motion carried. Dick Snell asked to make a comment regarding the February minutes. He said that on page six it was recorded that Jason Groenewold had expressed concerns regarding the lack of truthful information during all steps in Chem Demil process. Mr. Snell said that he understands Mr. Groenewold having his own feelings and thoughts on the performance of the facility but if he makes statements that untruths are being told but he should have information to support that allegation. Mr. Bauer said that he would tend to give someone who wants to make a statement more latitude than if they were trying to seek information from another person. He added that he agreed with Mr. Snell to keep personal attacks out of the meetings.

It was determined by the CAC members that they would keep the membership to 11 persons as it now stands.

Mr. Bauer read a press release by the Outreach Office stating that Mr. Gary Harris and his attorney have terminated their depositions with the Army. Dennis Downs said that Mr. Harris has been removed as a witness during the hearings to be held before the DSHW Board. Mr. Bauer said that he does not know how this will affect his invitation to speak to the CAC.

STATUS AT STOCKPILE SITES - Tim Thomas

Mr. Thomas said that CAMDS has just completed the alternative technologies assessment for hydrolosate and they are going through a closure process. They have generated enough hydrolosate at CAMDS to conduct some testing of the super critical water oxidation unit that is located in Texas. This supports the Newport project and will provide information for them to go forward with their design. Mr. Thomas said that they are conducting some swatch testing of DPE's in the material decontamination chamber for the JACADS project. The intent is to identify different ways of decontaminating and disposing of the Demilitarization Protective Ensemble Suits. They are looking for the most cost effective way of dealing with that.

They are also in the final state of preparation for the VX sampling. This is for the VX that they plan to process. Mr. Thomas said that they are in discussions with the Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste. They are also performing some mustard mortar downloads for the non-stockpile program.

At Johnston Island (JACADS) they have recently completed the 155mm VX Projectile campaign. They are now looking to the 8 inch projectiles and the landmine processing. This is the first facility to reach the closure process. They plan to go into closure around the first of 2001.

The Anniston facility is about 78% complete. The Umatilla facility is about 80% complete.

Pine Bluff construction is at 14% complete. Mr. Thomas said there have been some labor problems at Umatilla in regards to construction. As a result, there have been six or seven bomb threats. At the Pine Bluff site there were some individuals that were in a large trench and they became dizzy. It has been confirmed that it was not agent related. It is believed to have been some swamp gas.

At the Aberdeen facility the System Contractor Administration Building is ready for occupation and the Munitions Demil Building is scheduled to begin construction in April 2000. The Newport facility will break ground on April 8, 2000.

Questions

Geoff Silcox: What are you doing for the VX sampling?

Tim Thomas: This is a process for characterizations of the VX stockpile. We take a representative sample of the stockpile and analyze it. We look for metals. We look for products of decomposition. We try to characterize the stockpile based on the samples that we pull. We try to pull a number of samples that will give us a high confidence level in what we expect to see in the mixture of munitions. **Geoff Silcox:** At the last meeting Col. Pate mentioned ultra sonic analysis.

Tim Thomas: Ultra sonic analysis could be part of that sample process. We have found out that the VX is very clean. It is probably the last agent, of all of the agents, to be manufactured. The ultra sonics that we plan to do is related to the solids in the mustard munitions.

Dan Bauer: On the testing of ? is that considered dunnage at this point?

Tim Thomas: It is considered hazardous waste. We are trying to draw the level of agent contamination down so that we can handle it through a permitted land fill. We are looking at the best technique to take it down for safe level for handling.

Rosemary Holt: At what point would it be feasible for you to share the JACADS shutdown? Is that something that we would want to know while you are in the process? I know that it is a few years out for us but is it feasible to share it with us?

Tim Thomas: Absolutely, there is a joint team put together with EPA, the folks in Hawaii, the folks at Ratheon and the Air Force which is the owner of the island. They have had a number of meetings regarding to closure. If you would like we would be happy to share where they are and where they are going. Presently they are working on a proposal that has been submitted by the island contractor on closure. This is probably one of the more difficult areas to deal with because this is the first time it has been done and there are some unique issues in regards to the land owner issues. Johnston Island will probably be reverted back as fish and game preserve. The Air Force is the owner and the Army is running the disposal facility. There are a lot of interface challenges on that project.

Rosemary Holt: It might seem premature at this point, but while you are in the process it might be appropriate as we anticipate these same steps rather than wait and look back.

Tim Thomas: I agree with you. We have already kicked off our planning process for closure. There are a number of steps that we need to go through. We have asked for a proposal from our contractor to put together a plan. We have asked for a plan for the plan. We just to put together a team. We want to make sure that every body is involved in this process. We will work closely with the Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste.

Cindy King: I have a two prong question. When you are talking about your DPE suits aren't they used as a demilitarization process? How are you going to remove the waste code? Is it not true that the process in what you are using of the 5X treatment method has not approved by any environmental regulation?

Tim Thomas: We don't intend to use remove the waste code on the DPE's. They will retain a waste code and go to a hazardous waste landfill. This is not a 5X treatment but this something that we have worked with the Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste.

Jason Groenewold: I had a question about the case where the individuals got dizzy in the trenches and do you know if at JACADS all of the VX munitions that have been incinerated were drained below the 5% heel.

Tim Thomas: Yes, they have had a very effective drain on those.

Jeff Schmerker: Were the workers in Umatilla unionized?

Tim Thomas: Yes.

Jeff Schmerker: Was that the root of the labor problem?

Tim Thomas: As I mentioned they are about 80% complete in their construction. They are in transition from one type of craft worker to another. It has been a lucrative job in that area and I am not sure that they want to quit.

PLANT STATUS - Mike Rowe

Mike Rowe began his presentation by stating that the portion of Ratheon that operates the facility at JACADS is Ratheon Demil Company. The base is operated by others. A contract was just recently awarded to Ratheon services which EG&G Defense Materials is a prime subcontractor for base operations at JACADS. EG&G expects to take over clinic operations, fire, law enforcement and environmental safety at Johnston Island. EG&G Defense Materials will be an intimate player in the closure of Johnston Atoll. In addition to that EG&G has worked closely through PMCD with Ratheon in starting the plan for TOCDF.

At TOCDF they are continuing to run 105mm projectiles. They are running the energetic lines at about 2000 projectiles a week and they augment that with about 8000 non-energetic projectiles per week. Mr. Rowe said that they have had a good month running around 10,000 projectiles a week. The rockets and ton containers continue to be processed.

There have not been any vent or stack emissions. However, Mr. Rowe said that on February 20th they did have a level four action. On February 20, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. they were performing maintenance on the deactivation furnace system. The system was off line and had been shut down for maintenance to the heated discharge conveyor system. When that system is started back up they heat it up to 300 degrees and then they lubricate that chain so that it runs smoother during the operation. When they were putting the hatches back on the system, the flow through the furnace was upset. The operator that was in the control room operating the draft system in the furnace over manipulated the dampers and caused a slight back draft from the ECR through the furnace out into the room where the two workers were lubricating the chain. At that time there was an ACAMS alarm in the room and the employees were told to leave the area immediately. They left the area in about six minutes. The maximum reading the room went to 10 TWA (time weighted averages).

Mr. Rowe pointed out that there were two problems that transpired during this time. First, the action of the operator to manipulate the draft system with people in the room. Second, when the operators were advised to leave the room the communication was not clear enough and they did not put on escape masks on for the six minutes that it took them to leave the room. Mr. Rowe said that during that time there was a maximum potential of .125 of TWA environment that the operators could have been in during those six minutes. Mr. Rowe reminded the CAC, one TWA is how long you can work in a room for eight hours a day, forty hours a week, for an entire career and not see any ill effects.

This was declared a Chemical Event. Any time a person is in a room without adequate personal equipment and the reading exceeds one TWA it is considered a Chemical Event. It was Col. Pate's authority to declare this a Critical Event, which he did, and it was reported to the media and etc.

Mr. Rowe said that they have taken several corrective actions to ensure that this does not happen again. He said that this event happened in category B area and when agent alarms in that room typically it is not occupied. In the future when ever anyone is in a room - regardless of the category - and an alarm sounds everyone will be required to mask immediately. Also they will not allow operations in a room that can effect the draft in furnace when it is shut down.

The individuals involved in the Chemical Event were taken to the clinic and tested. They had their blood drawn and the tests revealed that they did not have an agent exposure.

Mr. Rowe also talked about what will follow the GB campaign. He said that from an industrial point of view that it makes good sense to operate the facility in campaigns because it is very difficult and expensive to keep switching back and forth. The original concept was to do several changes of munitions. They reevaluated that from a risk base and a cost base. The question then became what is the next munition to run. He said that the number one advantage, that overwhelms everything, is to run VX next. By doing this they get rid of VX ton container rockets which will reduce the risk to the public and the employees the quickest. By doing it with the configuration that they have now there will be fewer things that have to be adjusted. Another advantage is that it will allow more time to evaluate what they have in the mustard program and figure out the best technology to drain as much out of the container that is practical prior to incineration. It would take about 10 months to do the VX campaign. Mr. Rowe added that there is an advantage to going into the mustard campaign also. Mustard is a very straight forward long bulk campaign. They do the same thing day after day for years. He said that it is simpler to decontaminate mustard than VX. VX is the most difficult to contaminate and they have to make sure the plant is decontaminated. But the overwhelming issue is that it reduces the risk the quickest to go to VX and that is their plan at the present. They have about two million pounds of VX versus ten million pounds of mustard.

Questions

Dan Bauer: When do you expect to be through with the GB campaign?

Mike Rowe: We are evaluating the schedule as we speak. It would probably be the end of 2001. There are some issues and technical things that we are trying to some assistance from PMCD, back east, to optimize that process.

Dan Bauer: Do you feel that the total campaign is on schedule?

Mike Rowe: There is some potential growth in the G and the 155 issue.

Jason Groenewold: Where will the VX campaign be handled, CAMDS?

Mike Rowe: This is strictly a TOCDF campaign. Except for land mines. The VX land mines will be done at CAMDS.

Jason Groenewold.: What about the rockets?

Mike Rowe: They will be done at TOCDF.

Jason Groenewold: Is that a recent change?

Tim Thomas: We have a change management process in which we go through and evaluate where we are and then we have public comment on changes. As we are going through the process we did a Quantitative Risk Assessment and looked at the risks associated with VX vs GB. We looked at risks of processing rockets at CAMDS vs TOCDF and determined the best place to deal with all of them, except for land mines, was at TOCDF.

Jason Groenewold: Going back to the Chemical Event. You said that there was a back draft that came in the explosive containment room. Was there a munition in that area that was being drained?

Mike Rowe: No, the machine was completely shut down and locked up for maintenance.

Jason Groenewold: Were there any weapons at any time in either the explosive containment room or in the kiln?

Mike Rowe: There were none in the firebox.

Jason Groenewold: I guess I am confused as to where the agent came from.

Mike Rowe: From the category A area.

Tim Thomas: There definitely were not any munitions in the area. It probably came from inside the gates. What happens when it is positive in pressure that would have made it more positive and just drew more gases from the gate area.

Mike Rowe: That is the air lock between the explosive compartment room in the furnace.

Jason Groenewold: There was agent present in that area?

Mike Rowe: There is always agent present there. It is a category A area. It was drawn out H back system. Jason, If you would like me to draw you a picture afterwards I will sit with you and show you the background.

Jason Groenewold: Yes, if we could do that.

ACWA UPDATE - Dan Bauer

Mr. Bauer, Dennis Downs and Cindy King attended the recent ACWA meeting. Mr. Bauer presented the CAC with an update on that meeting. Mr. Bauer said that he thought that it was a successful meeting. He talked about the public laws that govern the ACWA Program. He said that the ACWA program is at the point where they are going to be doing some work to locate a pilot plant scale of at least two of the technologies that are in the process. Initially there were fifteen alternative technologies that was narrowed down to six. Because of some funding issues those were narrowed down to three. Of those three, two went to demonstration. The third was very similar to incineration. Of the two that went to the next level, one was super water oxidation and the other was a bio treatment. Mr. Bauer said that ACWA has received more funding and will look at the viability of four other alternative technologies.

Br. Bauer also talked funding for the ACWA program. He also stated that when they looked at the pilot plants for ADS, Tooele was not included because the munitions that are needed for that engineering study have been projected to be destroyed before they got on line. Tim Thomas added that they are planning on demonstrating a solvated electronic technology at CAMDS for the treatability study.

Questions

Roger Grenier: The recent Arthur Andersen Report talked about the length of time it will take to complete the destruction of the munitions using alternative technology. Was there any dialogue of that assessment of the practicability, cost or schedule?

Cindy King: The scheduling is the big issue. Arthur Andersen have not released their supplementary report. There are several reports out that have not been released that talk about where the schedule is. They will be re-figuring and negotiating during the next two weeks. The last week in March they will be discussing these various reports and that will be how scheduling will be determined.

Dan Bauer: They didn't put in Umatilla in the pilot plant because of their projected scheduled completion on certain munitions.

Cindy King: The issue of scheduling and timing of processing was widely discussed because there is un-cooperation with PMCD being forthright of where they are in their actual scheduling.

Dan Bauer: There are some safeguards built into the language for the pilot plant in case some scheduling flaws are found or conditions change and another site might be considered as a pilot plant area.

Roger Grenier: The last time Bill Pehlivanian addressed us I asked him when was the soonest that he projected when an alternative technology facility would go on line with a full production. I am wondering now that additional technologies are going to be evaluated what that would do to the projection that he made at the point?

Dan Bauer: If it was found like the technologies in demo two was found to be the only viable one it would probably length that time line. To what extent I do not know. The most pertinent thing is that by the time they go through pilot plant and then they do construction of a full scale plant and run it as a pilot plant a lot of the stockpiles as scheduled to already be almost completed.

Cindy King: One thing that you need to remember is that if a safer technology is found the Secretary of Defense is mandated to put that in a baseline facility. That is a public law.

Roger Grenier: I found it interesting that in the Arthur Andersen Report it states that if alternative technology were applied to TOCDF it would extend the schedule to 2018 with a \$2.5 billion cost.

Dan Bauer: We didn't discuss that and I am not sure if those numbers still hold.

DIVISION OF SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT - Marty Gray

Mr. Gray said that his presentation tonight would be in response to a request at the last CAC meeting. He was asked to tell the CAC about the last Notice of Violation and the Order of Compliance that was issued to TOCDF.

The last inspection dates for the last Notice of Violation was from July 1997 to 1998. It took almost a year to issue. The notice was issued on June 18, 1999. There were 107 separate findings and 77 of those were reported to DSHW by the Army's audit program. DSHW then looks to determine violations they look at the actual permit and the rules to determine which regulations were violated. They found 22 different violations with some violations having multiple actions.

The violation types that they found were:

- **Open HW waste containers** - DSHW rules require any container that holds hazardous waste be closed until waste is being added to it. The waste was residue that was left over from the demil process. It was brine or ash. A lot of those were found in the brine reduction area.
- **Unlabeled HW containers** - The DSHW rules require the containers are where the inspectors can any time inspect the labels to make sure that they say hazardous waste. They also have to have an accumulation date to show when hazardous waste was put into those containers. DSHW found some instances where they were missing labels or the containers were turned so that the inspectors could not see the labels.
- **Storage longer than 90 days** - DSHW rules require that unless they have a permitted area to store hazardous waste they can only keep it on site for 90 days. There were five of these occurrences at

TOCDF.

- **Failure to remove a leaking tank from service** - The permit requires that if they find a leak in the tank or the equipment going to or from the equipment they take that tank out of service. DSHW found one occurrence where a pipe coming out of a waste tank had a small leak. The facility had documented a small leak but they did not take the tank out of service immediately.
- **Failure to close valves** - DSHW regulations also requires that a valve does not have an open end. They found four occurrences where the valves were not capped at the end. This is to prevent an operator from opening the valve and waste coming out.
- **Failure to notify mailing list of class 1 mod** - Any time the facility does a class one modification - once it has been approved - they have 90 days to put out a notice to the mailing list that the changes have been made. There was one occurrence where they notified the mailing list but notified it nine days late.
- **Denial of access to operating records** - There was one case where an inspector was on site and an employee had an operating record and the inspector asked for a copy of the record but was not given it. He was not allowed to have the record. For DSHW that was a big problem because they like unedited data. DSHW has resolved this issue with TOCDF. It was a record of ton containers that had been processed that day.
- **Implementing design changes prior to approval** - Before changes are made to a system that requires a class two modification or any tank system. They had put in some sampling ports on a tank prior to a class two modification being approved. That modification was later approved.
- **Failure to follow the waste analysis plan, inspection plan and training plan** - These are three different plans that are required by regulations. For the waste analysis plan they did not take some density analysis that they were supposed to do on some brine before it was processed. There were some improper methods used by the contract lab also. The violation on the inspection plan was for failure to either fill out forms properly or they did not fill out the forms at all. There were several of these violations. For the training plan the regulations require that everyone that manages hazardous waste has a job description. DSHW found eleven missing job descriptions. They also found a few employees that were behind on their training.
- **Failure to analyze monitoring equipment** - This refers to some DAAM tubes. There were seven tubes that were not properly analyzed after they were pulled. Two of these were on the stack. DSHW checked back to see when these DAAMS were in place on the stack and found that it was during normal operations and there no ACAMS alarms at that time.
- **Storage of waste not listed in the permit** - The rules require that they identify the hazardous waste categories for the waste that is managed in the tanks in the furnace. The tanks at TOCDF were listed to only hold P999, which is agent, and DO3. As a result of sampling that was done through the ton container sampling program DSHW found that there were additional metal waste codes that were applicable. TOCDF failed to identify those and put those in their permit.
- **Improper sump management** - The permit requires TOCDF to pump their sumps out every 24 hours. There were some that missed the 24 hour time frame. A couple of sumps were filled to high and actually overflowed.
- **Failure to maintain and test monitoring equipment** - There was a CO carbon monoxide monitor for the liquid incinerator that was not properly tested. There was an ACAMS in the tox room - that is where the agent collection tanks are - that was not properly operating. There was also two trays of projectiles that were not monitored before they come out of the furnace.
- **Feeding waste while Waste Feed Cutoffs not operating** - There were two occasions when they were feeding waste when the automatic waste feeds were not properly operating. There was one where the flow gauge for agent flows into the furnace was not properly scaled. It could have had improper readings. DSHW looked back to check the operations to see if there could have been an overfeed of agent and found that TOCDF had normal operations on that day. All of the emission monitors had operated normal. Also, there was one violation where the ph meter was not on line properly and the ph of the brine for the pass system was not normal.
- **Improper waste feed** - These violations deal mainly with maintenance waste. When they have a ton container that they cannot tell if they have a proper drain on it DSHW requires that they take a stick and

dip it in to make sure that the agent has is below a certain level. A couple of times they dropped the stick in the ton container and they are not supposed to do that. There was also some maintenance type debris that they are not permitted to feed was fed to the furnace.

- **Operating equipment with sensors bypassed** - These sensors were in for the demil equipment such as the rocket shear machine. Things that take the munitions apart or cut them up. The permit identified the sensors and therefore they were required to be operating. As some sensors would go out the operators could manually move munitions past certain points. That is a violation of the permit.
- **Failure to notify DSHW** - When TOCDF has a ton container that they cannot verify a complete drain they call DSHW to let them know. They then go in and dip in a stick to see if they get a complete drain. Twice they failed to notify DSHW before they went in. They then went ahead and fed the munition. DSHW discovered this when they reviewed TOCDF's records. Mr. Gray said that TOCDF has had to go in and verify whether or not they have had a proper drain quite a bit lately. About one month ago every single ton container - in a certain lot - was not completely filled. Because they did not get the required drain they had to go in and check everyone of those.

Mr. Gray said that they find these violations by inspections with TOCDF's record keeping and on site visual inspections. He said that there isn't any place that they cannot go, however, if they wanted to inspect inside the explosive containment room they would have to wait for the equipment to shut down and the right conditions to go in. DSHW has people who are trained in DPE who can go in and do inspections. Over three fourths of the violations have been self reported by TOCDF.

Mr. Gray explained to the CAC penalties for the violations. They have developed a penalty violation matrix (attachment 1). He explained that they look at the violations for the potential for harm and how far did they deviate from the rules. One of the Major/Moderate violations was for an emergency response van that they had at the facility. They had required equipment that needed to be in the van. They had come up with a different checklist that was in the permit and all of the equipment that they needed was not in that van. DSHW considered that major potential for harm. If that van had to respond it didn't have the right equipment. That has been fixed and they have the right checklist now.

Mr. Gray stated that they resolve the Notice of Violations by an Adjustment Factor. They look at whether or not a violation occurred more than one day they take that in to account. They look at whether or not there is good faith on the facility to comply. He said that one good example of good faith from the facility is the self reporting program that they have. They negotiate the penalty lower because of the good reporting that they do. Another factor is the willfulness and willingness to resolve things quickly. They also look at a history of compliance and repeat violations. There is also another category of unique factors that Mr. Gray said that he didn't believe that they have used at TOCDF.

Questions

Rosemary Holt: Thank you very much for the quality of your presentation. How is it looking for the year June 1999 to June 2000 in comparing with last year.

Marty Gray: We have completed our 1999 inspection. A number of violations were again self reported through their self audit report. We did find more violations this time. I have not compared it to see if it the same or if it is more or less. We are looking at the right now.

Rosemary Holt: Will you be able to share with us once a year as you are doing now.

Marty Gray: Sure.

Dave Ostler: Let's go back to the couple of gas masks that were missing in the emergency vehicle. Let's suppose that their own internal inspection went over the check list and realized that they were not there. The best thing

would be to immediately make sure that they got there. Are they supposed to report that immediately even though there has not been an occurrence. The vehicle may not have even been out of its parking garage during that period of time. Are they supposed to report that?

Marty Gray: They would report that and we would take that into consideration the fact that they found it and fixed it as soon as they found it.

Tim Thomas: We have a reward fee for environmental compliance and this is almost a double penalty to EG&G. For those violations that they are responsible for they are accountable for the fines. We also grade them a reward fee perspective. That is used as criteria and the reward fee can be reduced as a result of these violations. It is a very intense process. They have an effective program and they working hard to lower these violations. We are in the phase where the human error aspect of it is a real issue. We have to work on the behavioral aspect of it. As an example, if you miss a DAAMS tube that is a violation but there are 10,000 DAAMS tubes that are pulled each year.

Dave Ostler: Can you estimate how many pages of regulations that management has to be on top of to be in compliance?

Mike Rowe: I have a four and a half inch RCWA. There is a twelve volume permit.

Roger Grenier: Of the total inspections that you look at what percentage do you estimate find discrepancies?

Marty Gray: I think that Tim just gave a good example with the number of DAAMS tubes (10,000) that are pulled and we found seven. With the number of inspections that are required only ten were missed. I couldn't give you a percentage but it is fairly low. If I were to compare them with another hazardous waste incinerator, they do a pretty good job out there.

Jason Groenewold: You mentioned ton containers that have been coming back with an improper drain reading. Do you know how those lot numbers match up with the 900 or so ton containers where the previous history of those are fairly vague and unknown?

Marty Gray: We know the history of those tons. I don't remember right now but they can give me a lot number and say we have low drains on this lot. We can look at it and say yes, these used to contain mustard or etc. We have a data base where we can track those down.

Jason Groenewold: Were they part of the 900?

Marty Gray: I know what you are talking about, but I don't remember if they are or not. I can look it up but I just don't remember.

Jason Groenewold: How about the ton container that you were denied the access on. Do you know which lot that was matched up with?

Marty Gray: It wasn't one ton container. It was the daily operating record for one day and they were processing ton containers that day. We require them to track those ton containers when they go into the plant and all the way through the process. There were a number of them that they processed that day. We did get that data the next day after we talked to some people. It looked good when we got it. There is concern when you don't get it when you are supposed to that it could be edited.

Tim Thomas: By the way, we have trained that person.

Mike Rowe: Let me get one thing clear. We will not hold any information from the state. This was a concern

because the operating record was being generated and had not gone through the its normal quality control process. The answer is, if they want it they can have it.

STOCKPILE REPORT - Col Ed Pate

Col. Pate updated the CAC on some other things that have been going on at Deseret Chemical Depot. He said that they will be shipping training rockets next week to Hawthorne, Nevada for recycling. It will take them three days to ship out all of the rockets at DCD. They do not, and never did, contain chemical agent. He said that they are training rockets only and not on the Treaty Declarable list at the Depot. He said that there will be inspectors at Hawthorne to watch the recycling to confirm that there is not any agent in those rockets.

Col. Pate gave a listing of the members who are serving on the Restoration Advisory Board. (Attachment 2). Col. Pate said that they will be briefing this group on the closure activities as they look at the Depot as a whole.

Col. Pate talked about the time frame for identifying a non-stockpile munition that has been dug up at another state but wanted to send to DCD for storage. (Attachment 3) He said that Munition Assessment Review Board determines how dangerous the round is, where it is located, how important it is to move it and where they want to move it too. They will then make the recommend where it is be shipped or destroyed on site.

Col. Pate discussed the rounds that are to be moved to Dugway for the processing by their Munitions Management Device (MMD-1). Mr. Steve Byrd, the program manager, who is doing the move is planning to brief the CAC before the move in June.

The Treaty Inspection- which is an international team - was held at DCD this past week and there were no discrepancies between DCD's treaty declaration and what the inspection team found Col. Pate briefed the CAC on the leakers found at DCD. (Attachment 4)

Questions

Dan Bauer: Do you have a feel for the Russian's mobile Demil operations?

Col Pate: I know that they were trying to build a pilot facility at one of their storage plants. I have not heard anything at all on it.

Dan Bauer: I would appreciate it if you hear anything you could let us know.

Col Pate: I will try to find out.

Cindy King: I noticed tonight that in the audience there is a representative of the sovereign nation of the Skull Valley Goshutes. I do understand that the transportation of hazardous waste is a big issue. Have you or your officials notified that sovereign nation about that transportation.

Col. Pate: I have not notified them. I know that Mr. Byrd has been involved with them in their public meetings.

Cindy King: There has been some concern about not being informed as a sovereign nation as a formal process. Is the depot planning to - - - ?

Col Pate: The depot is not in charge of the move. The Goshute representative participates on restoration board on a regular basis.

Cindy King: They just wanted me to inform that they have not been informed. If there are any up coming

meetings they need an official invitation.

Gary Griffith: If they go over Johnson's Pass or Lookout Pass it won't effect them.

Kari Sagers: Lookout Pass is the one they are planning to use.

A motion was made and seconded for the next CAC meeting to be held on May 18, 2000. The motion carried.

Dennis Downs discussed the possibility of having someone from the DSHW board present to the CAC their responsibilities and how their role relates to TOCDF. Mr. Bauer said that he would like to do that in a future meeting.

The meeting adjourned at 7:50.